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1 Introduction
This paper examines the entry process of retail and wholesale trade …rms
into the Swedish market between 1990 and 1996. It is generally believed
(see e.g., Geroski, 1991) that new …rms produce a number of bene…ts. For
instance, the entry, or the threat of entry, of new …rms is assumed to force
prices down, thereby eliminating excess pro…ts. Moreover, high entry rates
may stimulate innovation, and increase productivity and product quality.
In Sweden, as in other countries, retail and wholesale trade are constantly
changing sectors, and in recent years, for example, out-of-town shopping,
chainstores’ market shares, andthenumber of international competitors have
all increased (see e.g., Bergström, 1999). However, the number of …rms and
total employment have increased more over the last decade in the wholesale
than in the retail trade sector. Moreover, a relatively larger proportion of
the employees in the wholesale trade sector work in a company owned by a
…rm headquartered outside Sweden (see Bergström et al., 2002).
Previous empirical studies (see e.g., Love, 1996; Audretsch and Fritsch,
1994; Keeble and Walker, 1994; and Dunne et al., 1988) have generally used
aggregated data on …rm entry or have focused excessively on manufactur-
ing …rms. This is unfortunate because the entry process may di¤er between
industrial sectors. For instance, Berglund and Brännäs (2001) have found
that the determinants of entry di¤er between eight studied industrial sectors
in Sweden. Moreover, Troske (1996) and Pakes and Ericson (1998) present
results indicating that new non-manufacturing …rms’ grow to the size of the
incumbents more quickly than do new manufacturing …rms. The latter study
is to our knowledge the only one that has examined the dynamics of re-
tail trade …rms, while we have found no study examining the entry pattern
of wholesale trade …rms. As the non-manufacturing sector of the economy
grows, it has become increasingly important to gather information on the
entry process of these …rms as well.
Inthis paper, aPoisson regressionmodel is used tostudythe entry process
of retail and wholesale trade …rms in Sweden. In contrast to previous empir-
ical studies, who have focused on either …rm (branch) speci…c data or region
speci…c data, we are able to access …rm-, branch- and region-speci…c data at
the municipality level. We believe this to be important because the entry
process of new …rms may be in‡uenced both by …rm and branch speci…c fac-
tors, as well as regional characteristics. In addition, this is to our knowledge
the …rst paper analyzing new …rm entry into the retail and wholesale trade2
markets.
The results indicate that few new …rms enter markets where incumbent
…rms face lowpro…ts and highsunk costs, or where the market has previously
beencharacterizedby thepresenceofa local monopoly. This is tobeexpected
since economic theory predicts entry to be more common when the minimum
e¢cient scale, i.e., sunk costs, are low. Moreover, monopoly …rms can use
excess pro…ts to discourage entry in a number of ways. One way would
be to use the excess pro…ts for marketing e¤orts, thereby increasing brand
loyalty. Our results suggests that incumbent …rms may engage in strategic
behavior in order to prevent the entry of new competitors. In addition, we
…nd a number of regional variables that a¤ect entry behavior in the retail
and wholesale trade sectors.
The paper is organized as follows: the next section presents the theoret-
ical framework of our study; section three describes the data used; section
four presents the empirical model and the projected results; and section …ve
presents the main conclusions and suggestions for future work.
2 The Model
We assume that …rms enter a particular market with the intention of making
a pro…t, and that potential entrants face entry costs. Bain (1956) de…ned
barriers to entry as the extent to which established …rms can elevate their
sellingprice above theirminimum averagecost without stimulatingentry into
the industry. Some possible barriers to entry mentioned in the literature (see
e.g., Spence, 1977; Dixit, 1979) include economies of scale or scope, product
di¤erentiation and absolute cost advantages of established …rms.
Following Rudholm (2001), we assume that the markets are characterized
by imperfect competition, andthat …rms enter a given market until the pro…t







Cikt(qikt) ¡ Fit = 0; (1)
where ¼it denotes the pro…t of the potential entrant i (i = 1;:::;n) in period
t (t = 1990;:::;1996). In equation (1), pikt(Qkt) is the price of product k as a
function of the total market sales of that product, qikt is the sales of product
k of the potential entrant conditional on entry, and Cikt(qikt) is the total sales3
costs as a function of the sales volume of product k. Thus, ¼it represents the
total pro…t for a …rm in the wholesale- or retailing trade business selling a
total of K di¤erent products. The term Fit can be interpreted as the entry
cost corresponding to the zero pro…t condition, i.e., when additional entrants
are unable to make pro…ts. This means that the pro…ts of already established
…rms can be positive without attracting the entry of new …rms. Let Fit take
the following form:







where c is a constant term, T is a trend variable, and ¢Nt = Nt ¡ Nt¡1 is
a measure of net entry in period t, meaning that the entry cost is allowed
to depend on recent entry by other …rms. The entry cost also depends on a
vector of general components (e.g., business cycles and institutional changes),
Gt; avectorre‡ectingbranchspeci…cexplanatoryvariables, Xjt, and avector
re‡ecting the characteristics of the municipality where the …rm is planning
to set up operations, Ymt; where the subscripts j and m denote branch and
municipality, respectively. Finally, the entry cost also contains a component,
»it, not observed by the researcher. »it is interpreted as a realization from a






k=1Cikt(qikt) as the pro…t opportunity
of the potential entrant in the absence of the entry cost. Substituting equa-
tion (2) into equation (1) and solving for ¢Nt = Nt ¡ Nt¡1, our measure of
net entry, gives the following expression:

















0. The parameter ®0 is a constant term,
° measures how potential pro…ts a¤ect entry, µ
0 captures general factors
at the national level in‡uencing …rms’ entry behavior, ¯
0
is a parameter
vector corresponding to the branch-speci…c explanatory variables, and ±
0
is a parameter vector corresponding to region-speci…c e¤ects. Finally, "it =
¡»it='1 is a random disturbance term which, from the assumptions regarding
»it, has zeromeanand constant variance. The variables usedinthe estimation
of equation (3), and thus related to equations (1) and (2) above, will be
discussed thoroughly in the empirical section.4
3 The Empirical Analysis
3.1 Data
We are able to access …rm- and region-speci…c data at the municipality level.
All Swedish …rms are legally bound to submit their annual reports to the
Swedish patent and registration o¢ce (PRV). Data from the annual reports
of …rms active in the wholesale and retail markets between 1989 and 1996
were used in this study. This data set was collected by Upplysningscentralen
AB(UC).1 Thedatainclude, amongother items, measures ofpro…ts, salaries,
…xed costs and liquidity.
The municipality-speci…c datawere provided by Statistics Sweden. These
data cover matters such as the tax levels, expenditures, government grants,
demographics, average income, political preferences, educational level and
unemployment in each municipality. Due to the division of some municipal-
ities into smaller units, as well as the mergers of three counties in Sweden
during the studied period, 56 municipalities were omitted from this study,
leaving a total of 233.
The sample was restricted to …rms with documented positive sales during
the study period. Before aggregating the data to the proper branch level,
our data set contained 31,448 retail trade …rms, and 35,550 wholesale trade
…rms (1996). Aggregating the data to the …ve digit SNI-code level2, we have
access to a total of 44,791 observations pertaining to the retail trade sector,
and 37,916 observations pertaining to the wholesale trade sector during the
study period. In addition,10,700 …rms entered the retail trade sector during
the study period, while 3,550 …rms exited the sector. In the wholesale trade
sector, there were 12,132 new entrants in the study period, while 3,690 …rms
exited the sector. Hence, we can observe a clear positive trend in the number
of retail and wholesale trade …rms during the study period.
3.2 Econometric Methods
Turning tothe econometric speci…cation of themodel, two aspects ofthe data
must be considered. First, since the number of …rms entering a market is a
1UC is a Swedish credit information …rm that collects economic information on both
…rms and individuals residing in Sweden.
2SNI refers to the Swedish standard industrial classi…cation.5
positive integer, acount data model is used. Second, thereare only a fewnon-
zero observations on entry, that is, nit is in many cases equal to nit¡1. The
Poisson regression model meets these requirements and corresponds directly
to the model presented in Section 2. Thus, we estimate a Poisson regression
model where net entry is regressed on a number of independent variables
separately for the retail and the wholesale trade sectors. As the focus of this
paper is entry into a speci…c branch of business, all …rm-speci…c data have







; ¢Njt = 0;1;2;3::::: (4)
where










zYmt + "it: (5)
Pro…t opportunities forthe entrant arecaptured by ¼0
jt¡1; which measures op-
erating pro…ts. Equation (5) also includes branch-speci…c …xed e¤ects (¹ Fjt)
in the sense that di¤erent intercepts are estimated for each type of busi-
ness. General factors at the national level that in‡uence the entry behavior
of individual …rms are captured by Gt , Xjt contain characteristics of the
incumbents that are assumed to prevent entry , Ymt is a vector of regional
determinants of entry , ®0 is a constant, "it is a disturbance term with zero
mean and constant variance, and ®1; °, ´¶ j, µ
0
g (g = 1;2;3), ¯
0
s (s = 1;2),
and ±
0
z (z = 1;:::;13) are parameters to be estimated.
The variable representing pro…t opportunities for entrants, as well as all
branch-speci…c variables, have been lagged one period. Lagging these vari-
ables has two advantages. First, this corresponds directly to the potential
entrant’s decision problem, since entrants only have access to other …rms’
annual reports with a one year time lag. Second, this setup makes it possible
to reduce a possible endogeneity problem. The data contains several pro…t
measures. We have chosen to use operating pro…ts since this measure cor-
responds to the pro…t/loss from the main line of business of the …rm. The
branch-speci…c …xed e¤ects have been included in the study, because barriers
3For the retail trade sector j = 1;2;:::;68:; for the wholesale trade sector j = 1;2;:::;56.6
to entry may vary systematically with unobserved factors such as, marketing
e¤orts.4
General determinants of entry at the national level, Gt, include the gross
domestic product (GDP), and two dummy variables re‡ecting the 1995 de-
cision to increase the minimum capital necessary for starting up a limited
company from SEK 50,000 to SEK 100,000. We expect to …nd both transi-
tory andpermanent e¤ects following on this change. First, potential entrants
may have chosen to enter the market beforethe increasedcapital requirement
was enacted. This transitory e¤ect is captured by a dummy variable taking
the value one in the year 1994, i.e., the last year a new …rm could be started
at a cost of SEK 50,000. Another dummy variable takes the value one for
the 1995-1997 period, re‡ecting a regime shift in the cost of starting up new
businesses. As the cost increased, this variable is expected to have a negative
e¤ect on entry.5
Branch-speci…c factors, Xjt, that are assumed to characterize barriers to
entry include sunk costs and a dummy variable re‡ecting regions with local
monopolies in the preceding period. Large sunk costs are believed to re‡ect a
commitment by incumbent …rms to stay in the market, as these investments
cannot be recouped if a …rm has to leave the market. We used the level
of long-term …xed assets (in relation to total assets), such as buildings and
machinery, as a proxy for thelevel of sunk costs. Adummy variablere‡ecting
regions with a local monopoly in time period t¡ 1 was added because local
monopolies can earn excess pro…ts which later can be used to fund entry
deterring behavior.
Net entry is, …nally, also assumed to be determined by region-speci…c
factors, Ymt. The regional characteristics used in the estimation of equation
(5) are population, population density, the municipality tax level, govern-
ment investment grants, local government debt, average per capita income,
the presence of a university or a university college, educational level of the
population, net migration, political preferences, political stability and local
unemployment.
Note that each municipality is formally free to set its tax level indepen-
dently. However, during the recession years from 1991 to 1993 local gov-
4For an overview concerning how advertising can create an advantage for incumbents,
see Comanor and Wilson (1979).
5A potential problem is that there might be other events a¤ecting entry during these
years. Hence, the parameter estimates for the dummy variables should be interpreted with
caution.7
ernments were temporarily deprived of this right. The availability of higher
education is represented by a dummy variable assigned the value one if a
university or a university college is located in the region. Data concerning
educational level within the municipality refers to the percentage of the pop-
ulation that has at least enrolled in courses at a university or a university
college. Political preferences are indicated by a dummy variable represent-
ing all local parliaments where non-socialist parties have the majority, while
political strength is measured by the Her…ndahl index.6
It is reasonable to expect the following results when estimating equation
(5). First, intercept terms may di¤er among branches. This follows because
the barriers to entry may vary systematically with unobserved factors, such
as marketing e¤orts. From the theoretical framework, it follows that more
entry should occur in branches where pro…ts are high, while sunk costs and
the presence of local monopolies should prevent entry.
Turning to the region-speci…c variables, population size, population den-
sity and average income in the municipality are used to measure the market
size for the potential entrant. A number of previous studies (see e.g., Au-
dretsh and Fritsch, 1994; Davidsson et al., 1994; and Guesnier, 1994) have
indicated that more entry occurs in regions where markets are large. Au-
dretsh and Fritsch (1994) among others have also found that entry is posi-
tively in‡uenced by the level of education in the region, possibly indicating
that …rms demand highly skilled labor. More entry is, therefore, expected
in municipalities with established universities and/or university colleges and
where a high percentage of the population have enrolled in higher education.
Entry may also be in‡uenced by the local unemployment rate. Davidsson
et al. (1994) note, however, that this e¤ect may be positive or negative. A
high level of unemployment may attract entry because this indicates that
the …rm has a large labor pool to draw from when recruiting. On the other
hand, high unemployment may discourage entry because it serves as an in-
dicator of lower regional demand in the future. Entry of new …rms may also
be in‡uenced by the municipality tax rate. For instance, high taxes may
prevent entry of new …rms because a relatively large share of the local ser-






where SHARE is the percentage of representatives from party p.8
vices are provided the public sector (see e.g., Fölster, 2000). On the other
hand, Sinn (1996) argues that redistributive taxation promotes risk-taking
and thereby stimulates self-employment. Turning to the variables concerning
political preference, we expect entry to be more common in municipalities
where there is a strong political leadership, as measured by the Her…ndahl
index, because this may creates astable working environment for the …rm. In
addition, …rms may prefer a non-socialist local government because this lead-
ership is likely to implement more bene…cial policies for the …rm compared
to a socialistic local government. Hence, the type of the political leadership,
socialist or non-socialist, might have an e¤ect on entry.
3.3 Estimation Results
Equation (5) is estimated by means of an iterative maximum likelihood tech-
nique. The estimation results are presented in Table 1.
The estimate of the time trendis negative andsigni…cant for bothsectors.
Turning to the parameter estimate for our GDP index, these arenegative and
signi…cant at the one-percent signi…cance level for both sectors. This result is
rather unexpected, but might re‡ect the fact that self-employment increased
during the recession of the early 1990s.
The dummy variable re‡ecting the regime shift is positive and signi…-
cant for both sectors, contrary to our expectations. Note, however, that the
dummy variables re‡ecting the costs of starting new companies also re‡ect
all other period-speci…c events that a¤ect entry.
Turning to branch-speci…c variables, we …nd that there is more entry
into branches where pro…ts are high. The parameter estimates for pro…ts are
signi…cantat the ten-percentlevel forretailtrade, andat theone-percent level
for wholesale trade businesses. Although this is as one would expect from
microeconomic theory, it has not been widely reported in previous empirical
studies of entry behavior (see e.g., Geroski, 1995). In this paper, we used the
level of long-term …xed assets (in relation to total assets) such as buildings
and machinery as a proxy for the level of sunk costs. The results indicate
that higher sunk costs decrease entry into the retail trade sector. Finally, the
parameter estimates regarding local monopolies are negative and statistically
signi…cant at the one-percent level for both sectors, indicating that entry is
less likely in branches where the incumbent …rm had a local monopoly in the
previous period.9
Table 1. Estimation results¤
Retail Wholesale
Variable (parameter) Estimate t-value Estimate t-value
Constant (®0) 2.88 3.25 1.81 1.84
Trend (®1) -0.11 -6.34 -0.14 -6.96
Pro…ts (°) 2.69E¡9 1.66 6.49E¡10 4.74
GDP (µ1) -0.038 -4.29 -0.049 -4.91
Dcapital (µ2) 0.23 3.47 0.21 2.87
Dcapital94 (µ3) 0.021 0.35 -0.0037 -0.05
Sunk cost (¯1) -0.18 -2.39 -0.027 -1.60
Dmonopoly (¯2) -0.71 -22.71 -0.73 -23.17
Population (±1) 4.9E¡6 18.53 4.59E¡6 19.45
Population density (±2) -0.00013 -3.20 0.000096 3.08
Migration (±3) -2.4E¡6 -0.12 -0.000061 -2.81
Unemployment (±4) -0.000016 -2.84 -0.000011 -1.88
Education (±5) 3.07 11.35 4.40 16.80
Income (±6) 0.000024 1.03 0.000037 2.53
Tax rate (±7) 0.018 3.36 0.031 5.37
Debt (±8) 0.22 3.85 0.38 6.45
Investment grants (±9) -0.00019 -0.89 -0.000042 -0.15
Dconservative (±10) 0.024 0.82 0.13 3.81
Political strength (±11) 0.79 3.01 1.16 4.00
Duniversity (±12) 0.23 5.91 0.13 3.33
Number of obs 44791 37916
Pseudo R2 0.20 0.29
*t-values are robust against overdispersion.
Turning to the variables re‡ecting regional di¤erences, we …nd that entry
is more common in areas with large populations. This result is statistically
signi…cant at the one-percent level for both sectors. However, the population
density seem to have a negative e¤ect on entry into retail trade, while it has
the expected positive e¤ect on entry into the wholesale trade sector.
Local unemployment rates have a negative impact on entry, suggesting10
that unemployment may serve as an indicator of regional demand. The
proportion of the population having a university and/or university college
education has a positive impact on entry, and …rms are more likely to enter
markets where they have access to a large stock of well-educated workers.
The variable re‡ecting average income per capita is positive for both sectors,
but statistically signi…cant only in the model concerning entry into wholesale
trade markets.
The parameter estimate concerning local tax rates shows that entry is
more common in regional markets where the tax rate is high. A variable we
consider to be closely related to taxes is the level of debt in relation to total
assets in the municipality. Municipalities with a large level of debt might be
forced to raise taxes in the future to repay their loans. Firms considering
entering a market in a particular area recognize this, and are thus reluctant
to enter. However, we …nd that the parameter estimates are positive for both
sectors, as well as statistically signi…cant at the one-percent level. We have
not been able to …nd any reasonable explanation for this unexpected result.
Turning to the variables re‡ecting political preference and the political
strength of local government, we …nd that entry into wholesale trade mar-
kets is more common in municipalities governed by non-socialists parties. In
addition, the parameter estimates show that entry is more common for both
sectors in municipalities where there is a strong political leadership, irrespec-
tively of the ideological inclination of the government. Our results indicate,
moreover, that municipalities with a university or a university college attract
more entries. Note, …nally, that the determinants of …rm entry into a local
market are similar for the retail and wholesale trade sectors.
4 Conclusions
This paper examines the determinants of …rm entry into the Swedish retail
and wholesale trade markets. The results suggest that entry is more common
in markets where the incumbents have high pro…ts, while entry is found to
be less common inmarkets characterizedby a single incumbent (i.e., markets
subject to local monopolies). Moreover, high required investments in sunk
costs were also found to discourage entry in the retail trade sector.
Regional factors are also found to in‡uence entry behavior. According to
theresults, regions characterizedby large populations, higheducational level,
the presence of a university college or university, large debts, high taxes and11
strong political leadershipare more likely to attract entry from other regions.
We observe a clear positive trend in the number of …rms despite the re-
cession during the years under study. This may indicate that …rms have
some other mechanism, aside from exiting, by which to adapt to chang-
ing market conditions. One such mechanism could, for instance, be invest-
ments/disinvestments in capital and/or labor. This is, therefore, an interest-
ing question for further research.
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